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CASE NOTES
THE EMPLOYER AS THE AGENT OF THE
INSURER IN THE ADMINISTRATION OF
THE GROUP INSURANCE PLAN:
ELFSTROM V. NEW YORK LIFE
INSURANCE CO. (CAL. 1967)
INTRODUCTION
The phenomenon of "group" insurance is rapidly becoming an
institution of modern life in America.' Broadly defined, it is the
coverage of a number of individual members of a group for the
purpose of protecting and providing for those members and their
beneficiaries.' Quite often the group is comprised of employees or
members of a labor union.' Group insurance is primarily character-
ized by remarkably low premiums4 which are paid by the employer
or by both the employer and employee.5 Typically, the insurer issues
a master policy to the employer, designating him as the policyholder,
and issues to each insured employee a certificate evidencing his
coverage and setting forth the conditions of insurance.6
The administration of a group insurance plan is handled either
by the insurer on the basis of information furnished by the em-
ployer,7 or by the employer itself.8 Under this latter arrangement,
in consideration of a reduced premium, the employer performs vir-
tually all the functions necessary to administer the insurance pro-
gram. The employer maintains and updates all pertinent records
of the individual insureds, determines eligibility for coverage, and
accounts for and collects that portion of the premium due from the
insureds.'
The growth of group insurance generally and the particular
popularity of the employer administered type have raised the ques-
tion of whether the employer in the administration of a group policy
acts as the agent of the insurance company or as the agent of the
1 R. EILERS AND R. CROWE, GROUP INSURANCE HANDBOOK 50-52 (1965). See also,
LIFE INSURANCE FACT BOOK 26-28 (1961).
2 J. APPLEMAN, INSURANCE LAW AND PRACTICE § 41 (1965).
8 Borst, Group Policyholder as Agent of Insurer or Group Member, 14 FEDERA-
TION OF INS. COUNSEL Q. 11 (Winter 1963-64).
4 See J. APPLEMAN, supra note 2.
5 See R. COUCH, CYCLOPEDIA OF INSURANCE LAW § 29 (1929).
6 J. APPLEMAN, INSURANCE LAW AND PRACTICE § 46 (1965).
7 D. GREGG, AN ANALYSIS OF GROUP LIFE INSURANCE 115 (1950).
8 Id. at 118.
9 Id.
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individual insured. In Elfstrom v. New York Life Insurance Co.10
the California Supreme Court held that the employer is the agent
of the insurance company in this regard.
ELFSTROM
The New York Life Insurance Company had issued a group
health and life insurance policy to the Fullerton Publishing Com-
pany on behalf of its employees. Fullerton paid a portion of the
premiums and deducted the balance from the wages of the insured
employees. The policy provided insurance benefits to stated classes
of employees in specified amounts," and also provided that only
those employees who worked more than 32 hours a week and who
had completed six months of continuous employment in a specified
class were eligible for coverage. Employees in Class C were entitled
to $4,000 in life insurance benefits but were required to earn $200
a month.
The policy was of the employer administered type and its actual
administration was conducted by Fullerton's bookkeeper. The in-
surer provided the bookkeeper with a manual setting forth in detail
the steps to be taken in performing such tasks as enrolling em-
ployees, adding and deleting dependents, reinstating and terminating
insurance, reporting details of coverage and premiums paid, and
issuing certificates of insurance. According to the manual the book-
keeper was instructed to determine whether an employee was eligible
for insurance before enrolling him in the plan. 2 In addition, the
insurer conducted an annual audit to determine whether the book-
keeper was properly administering the plan in accordance with the
terms of the policy.
Edgar F. Elfstrom was the president and major stockholder of
the Fullerton Publishing Company. His daughter, Brenda, was an
employee at Fullerton during the summer of 1959 earning a salary
of $200 a month. In September of 1959 Brenda returned to school
and thereafter worked at Fullerton only on those occasional week-
ends when she was at home. Her salary was reduced to $100 a
month.
Prior to returning to school, Brenda was informed by the book-
keeper that she was a full time employee, and that the waiting period
10 67 A.C. 511, 432 P.2d 731, 63 Cal. Rptr. 35, (1967).
11 From the facts of the case as related by the court, it may be inferred that the
employees were catagorized according to their salary and that the class to which an
employee belonged determined the amount of insurance for which he was eligible. Id.
at 512-13, 432 P.2d at 732-33, 63 Cal. Rptr. at 36-37.
12 Id. at 516, 432 P.2d at 736, 63 Cal. Rptr. at 40.
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of six months for joining the insurance plan would expire on the
first day of December at which time she would be added to the plan.
Brenda then signed a blank enrollment card."8
On November 30, 1959 the bookkeeper filled in the blanks on
the card and added Brenda as an insured under the group policy.
At that time the bookkeeper was aware that Brenda no longer
earned $200 a month or worked 32 hours a week, and therefore was
ineligible for insurance. Brenda died in June 1960 and the insurer
refused to pay the life insurance benefits on the ground that she was
ineligible for coverage.
The case focused on the precise question of whether the Fuller-
ton Company, in administering the group plan through its book-
keeper, was the agent of the insurer or the insured. If it was the
agent of the insurer, the bookkeeper's knowledge of Brenda's in-
eligibility was also the insurer's knowledge.' 4 Since the insurer ac-
cepted the premiums with such knowledge, it would be estopped
from asserting the insured's ineligibility." Conversely, if Fullerton
was the agent of the insured, the bookkeeper's conduct in making
false representations could be imputed to the insured,' 6 giving the
company cause to cancel her coverage.'
A consideration of this same question by many of the other
states has resulted in a sharp split of authority.' The proponents of
what appears to be the majority view take the position that the
employer acts as the agent of its employee and not as the agent of
the insurer. In support of this position they argue that the entire
arrangement was initiated by the employer for the benefit of the
13 It was not clear whether the card was entirely blank at the time of Brenda's
signature or if only the date was missing. However, the court noted that even if the
misstatements indicating that Brenda was eligible for coverage were on the card at
that time, this would not necessarily mean that she acted improperly. For at the time
she signed the card she was in fact earning $200 a month and working over 32 hours a
week. There was no indication in the record that Brenda knew she was not entitled to
the coverage, and so far as appears her only knowledge of the requirements for
coverage were those related to her by the bookkeeper, i.e., that she was a full time
employee and that her six month waiting period would expire on December 1. id. at
516, 432 P.2d at 733-34, 63 Cal. Rptr. at 37-38.
14 Piedmont S. Life Ins. Co. v. Gunter, 108 Ga. App. 236, -, 132 S.E.2d 527,
530 (1963); Baum v. Massachusetts Mut. Life Ins. Co., 357 P.2d 960, 964 (Okla.
1960); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 9(3) (1958).
15 John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Dorman, 108 F.2d 220, 224 (9th Cir.
1939); Baum v. Massachusetts Mut. Life Ins. Co., 357 P.2d 960 (Okla. 1960).
16 See, e.g., Reusche v. California Pac. Title Ins. Co., 231 Cal. App. 2d 731, 736,
42 Cal. Rptr. 262, 266 (1966). See also 2 CAL. JUR. 2d Agency § 152 (1957).
17 Security-First Nat'l Bank v. Earp, 19 Cal. 2d 777, 122 P.2d 901 (1942);
Kloehn v. Prendiville, 154 Cal. App. 2d 162, 316 P.2d 22 (1957). See also RESTATE-
MXNT OF CONTRACTS § 476 (1932).
18 Borst, Group Policyholder as Agent of Insurer or Group Member, 14 FFDERA-
TION OF INS. COUNSEL Q. 11, 12 (Winter 1963-64) (Cases cited therein).
[Vol. 8
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employees,"9 and in entering the contract of insurance with the
insurer, the employer is interested in obtaining insurance from, not
for, the insurer. 20 The underlying theme is one of paternalism of the
employer toward its employees. Such paternalism "[D]oes not have
the effect of making the benevolent parent the agent of the party
with whom he inaugurates a contract for the benefit of his chil-
dren."12' Furthermore, they argue, the real interests of the employer
are akin to those of the employee and adverse to those of the insurer.
This reasoning is supported by Boseman v. Connecticut General
Life Insurance Co.2" in which the United States Supreme Court said:
• ..Employers regard group insurance not only as protection at low
cost for their employees but also as advantageous to themselves in that
it makes for loyalty, lessens turn-over and the like. When procuring the
policy, obtaining applications of employees, taking payroll deduction
orders, reporting changes in the insured group, paying premiums and
generally in doing whatever may serve to obtain and keep the insurance
in force, employers act not as agents of the insurer but for their em-
ployees or for themselves. 23
Jurisdictions following the minority view regard the employer
as the agent of the insurance company. This has been characterized
as the more equitable of the two views on the theory that the em-
ployee should not be made to suffer on account of acts of the em-
ployer over whom he has no control.24 The minority points out that
in this tripartite relationship it is the insurer who consents to and
authorizes the employer to carry out activities which the insurer
himself would normally perform in other types of insurance and it
is the insurer who exercises control over the employer in these
matters. In such a situation, they conclude, fundamental principles
of agency demand that the employer be held to be the insurer's
agent.2"
The conflict of views is mirrored in two cases from California.
In John Hancock Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. Dorman,2" the in-
surance plan provided that the employer was to receive the em-
ployee's application, determine his insurability as an employee, and
determine the amount of his premium. In fact, the particular insured
19 Hroblak v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 50 Ohio L. Abs. 395, -, 79 N.E.2d 360,
364 (1947).
20 Duval v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 82 N.H. 543, -, 136 A. 400, 403 (1927).
21 Id. at -, 136 A. at 404.
22 301 U.S. 196 (1937).
23 Id. at 204.
24 Clauson v. Prudential Ins. Co. of America, 195 F. Supp. 72, 77 (D.C. Mass.
1961). See also J. APPLEMAN, INSURANCE LAW AND PaCTICE, § 43 (1965).
25 Greer v. Equitable Life Assur. Soc. of the United States, 180 S.C. 162, -,185
S.E. 68, 70 (1936). See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 1 (1958).
26 108 F.2d 220 (9th Cir. 1939).
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was not an employee but only a member of the board of directors,
and therefore ineligible for the insurance. The court held that the
employer was the agent of the insurer in administering the plan and
that by accepting the insured's premiums through the employer, the
insurer was estopped from asserting that the insured was not an
employee under the terms of the policy.27
However, the court in Eason v. Aetna Life Insurance Co.2 8 a
later case, reached the opposite conclusion.29 There, the insured and
his employer had a conversation in which the insured indicated that
he no longer wished to participate in the employer administered
insurance plan. The district court of appeal ruled that the conver-
sation was ineffective to cancel the employee's participation. Relying
on the Boseman case,8" the court held that the employer was the
agent of the employee and any communication between the two
"[h] as no more legal significance than an instruction by a principal
to his own agent. '[A] mere instruction [by a principal] to its agent
to cancel, does not operate as a cancellation.' ,,'
ANALYSIS
Before deciding that the Fullerton Publishing Company, in its
capacity as insurance plan administrator, was the agent of New
York Life rather than the agent of Brenda Elfstrom, the California
Supreme Court carefully noted the two views and studied the
rationale underlying each." Its decision to ally California with the
minority camp resulted from a consideration of the precise nature
of the insurer-employer and the employer-employee relationships,
and the application of basic principles of agency to those relation-
ships.
In essence, the insurer-employer relationship is characterized
by the insurer authorizing the employer to handle the administrative
details of the plan and, in turn, the employer consenting to so per-
form these tasks.3 3 It is further characterized by the insurer di-
recting and controlling the employer in its performance of this
27 Id. at 224.
28 212 Cal. App. 2d 607, 28 Cal. Rptr. 291 (1963).
29 In the Eason case, the California District Court of Appeal did not discuss the
contrary result reached by the federal court in the Dorman decision. Thus the conflict
was very much alive when the Elfstrom case reached the supreme court.
80 Boseman v. Connecticut Gen. Life Ins. Co., 301 U.S. 196 (1937).
31 Eason v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 212 Cal. App. 2d 607, 611, 28 Cal. Rptr. 291,
293-94 (1963).
32 Elfstrom v. New York Life Ins. Co., 67 A.C. 511, 516, 432 P.2d 731, 736-37,
63 Cal. Rptr. 35, 40-41 (1967).
83 D. GREGG, AN ANALYSIS OF GRouP LI'E INsURANcE 115-18 (1950).
[Vol. 8
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function. 4 The employer-employee relationship, on the other hand,
lacks any scintilla of control. At best, it may be said that the em-
ployee merely authorizes the employer to deduct a portion of the
premium from his wages. However, the employee in no way con-
trols the employer to make certain that the employer will protect
and act for the interests of the employee in administering the plan. 5
The element of control is the pivotal point of the case. The
court 6 examines both these relationships in light of agency's most
fundamental concept: "[a]gency is the relationship which results
from the manifestation of consent by one person to another that
the other shall act on his behalf and subject to his control, and
consent by the other so to act."3 7 From this examination the court
reaches the seemingly inescapable conclusion that:
... the insurer-employer relationship meets this agency test with regard
to the administration of the policy, whereas that between the employer
and its employees fails to reflect true agency. The insurer directs the
performance of the employer's administrative acts. and if these duties
are not undertaken properly the insurer is in a position to exercise more
constricted control over the employer's conduct.
3 8
CONCLUSION
It is submitted that within the confines of legal reasoning the
conclusion reached in the Elfstrom case is supported by the prin-
ciples of the law of agency. However, the decision can be equally
34 In the decision the court noted (Footnote 7) that the insurer, in its instruction
manual, directed the employer to perform the very act which led to the controversy-
i.e. determine the employee's eligibility for coverage. Further, (Footnote 8) the court
noted that the insurer was able to control the employer in its performance of this
function by reviewing its performance at the annual audit. Elfstrom v. New York Life
Ins. Co., 67 A.C. 511, 521-22, 432 P.2d 731, 738, 63 Cal. Rptr. 35, 42 (1967).
35 In normal circumstances the very nature of the employee's subordinate posi-
tion does not lend itself to the control of his employer. See, e.g., Clauson v. Pruden-
tial Ins. Co. of America, 195 F. Supp. 72, 77 (D.C. Mass. 1961). See also J. APPLE-
MAN, INSURANCE LAW AND PRACTICE, § 43 (1965).
16 Elfstrom v. New York Life Ins. Co., 67 A.C. 511, 521-22, 432 P.2d 731, 738,
63 Cal. Rptr. 35, 42 (1967).
37 Edwards v. Freeman, 34 Cal. 2d 589, 592, 212 P.2d 883, 884 (1949). See RE-
STATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY, § 1 (1958).
38 Elfstrom v. New York Life Ins. Co., 67 A.C. 511, 518, 432 P.2d 731, 738, 63
Cal. Rptr. 35, 42 (1967). The cases expounding the majority view, on the other hand,
do not appear to consider the control factor (see pp. 244-45 supra). They admit that
the employer acts for the insurer, but point out that at the same time he is likewise
acting for the employee. The latter is emphasized over the former presumably be-
cause the entire transaction with the insurer was initiated by the employer with the
employee's and not the insurer's benefit in mind. See, e.g., Duval v. Metropolitan Life
Ins. Co., 82 N.H. 543, -, 136 A. 400, 404 (1927). There it was said that "[T]he acts
of the employer .. .are claimed to be on behalf of the [insurer]. No reason is per-
ceived why this should be treated as an agency for the [insurer] rather than for the
employees."
